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Abstract
The goal of this project is to examine the public opinion of using technology to automate the MLB
strike zone and its possible effects on MLB’s run-scoring environment. To examine public opinion,
a survey will be administered and an interview with someone inside baseball scheduled for a more
nuanced look. To examine the possible effects, data from the 2007-2014 seasons will be analyzed using
Markov chains in an attempt to predict the differences between letting umpires call balls and strikes
and leaving it to technology. Initial results suggest that automation would increase offense, but that
fans are not quite ready to trust the technology.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Baseball
The strike zone is at the heart of Major League Baseball. Any hitter who wants to stick around
must learn to be disciplined about which pitches are in the strike zone and which are out, and any
pitcher who wants to last must learn to paint its edges. Any pitch that passes through the strike zone
without the batter making contact is a strike, while any pitch that does not cross the zone and is not
swung at is a ball.
“The count” in baseball refers to counting balls and strikes. After 4 balls, a batter draws a walk,
and after 3 strikes he has struck out. The count is represented as the current number of balls, followed
by a hyphen and the current number of strikes. For example, if there are 2 balls and 1 strike on a
batter the count is said to be 2-1. 1 Strike and no balls is an 0-1 count, etc. When the count reaches
3-2, it is said to be “full” because it can get no bigger. Another ball would lead to a walk and a new
batter with a fresh count, and another strike would lead to a strikeout and the same thing. Every plate
appearance starts with an 0-0 count, and can later progress to 0-1, 0-2, 1-0, 1-1, 1-2, 2-0, 2-1, 2-2, 3-0,
3-1, and 3-2. In all there are 12 possible states for the count to be in.
These calls are made by the home plate umpire, who must decide if a pitch was in the strike zone or
not. His job is made more difficult by having to crouch and view the plate over the catcher’s shoulder,
often leading to an angle that is off-center, and by the fact that major league pitches generally travel
at least 75 MPH and can reach up to 100 MPH! It should be obvious, then, that umpires do not get
every call right. Humans can only get so good at tracking tiny objects at incredible speeds; an umpire
might last actually “see” the baseball when it is still a good 5 or 10 feet from the catcher [1].
1.1.1 Important Terms and Acronyms
• PA = plate appearance. Every time a batter completes his time at bat (barring the inning ending
prematurely on a baserunning out), it is recorded as a plate appearance. All of a player’s counting
stats (at bats, sacrifices, walks, etc.) are included in his plate appearance total.
• TBF = total batters faced. This is the total number of plate appearances a pitcher participates
in. Total batters faced and plate appearances across MLB are equal every year.
• BIP/IP = “Ball in play/In Play”. Any pitch that is contacted by the batter and not a foul ball
is considered “in play.” Sometimes, this term also excludes home runs, but for the purposes of
this project it will encompass all fair contact.
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• K = strike out. When expressed as K%, it represents the percentage of opposing hitters that a
pitcher strikes out, or K/TBF. More strikeouts are better for a pitcher.
• BB = walk. When expressed as BB%, it represents the percentage of opposing batters a pitcher
walks, or BB/TBF. Fewer walks are better for a pitcher.
• HR = home run. This is the worst possible outcome of any given plate appearance for the pitcher.
• HBP = hit by pitch. A hit batsman gets first base for free. They are essentially walks, except
that runners may not advance after a HBP.
• ERA = earned run average. This is the number of runs, on average, that a pitcher allows per
nine innings pitched, not counting runs that scored due to a fielder’s error.
The following statistics are known as “plate discipline” stats.
• Zone. This is the chance that a pitcher throws the ball within the defined strike zone.
• OOZ = Out of zone percentage. This is the chance that a pitcher throws the ball outside of the
defined strike zone.
• Z-swing. This is the chance that the batter swings, given that the ball was in the strike zone.
• O-swing. This is the chance that the batter swings, given that the ball was not in the strike zone.
• Z-contact. This is the chance that the batter makes contact, given that he swings at a ball in the
zone.
• O-contact. This is the chance that the batter makes contact, given that he swings at a ball not
in the zone.
1.2 Automating the Strike Zone
Partly because of this and partly because of the unending forward march of technology, it has been
proposed by many that the strike zone should be automated, no longer subject to the discretion of
fallible humans. Despite all the conversation over how to automate the zone and why it must or must
not be done, there is surprisingly little discussion about the possible consequences of such automation.
With such a drastic change in how balls and strikes are called, there almost certainly will be a tangible
effect on run-scoring. Will batters or pitchers be helped more by the new, ultra consistent zone? What
will the magnitude of the change be? These things must be considered before implementing any new
technology, as MLB is already experiencing a rather sharp decrease in scoring, and a change that helps
pitchers too much could possibly drive away fans.
But how to predict these possible changes? We can’t just look back at plate appearances with
bad calls and imagine how they might have ended otherwise; once a pitch is called (correctly or
incorrectly), it changes the count that the rest of the plate appearance will be predicated on. One of
the best examples is a 1-1 count. Imagine that the pitcher throws a fastball just off the edge of the
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plate. If the pitch is called according to the rule book strike zone, it is a ball and the count will be
2-1, an advantage to the batter. But if the umpire thinks it was right on the edge and incorrectly calls
a strike, the count becomes 1-2, and the batter is on the defensive. Looking at the rest of that plate
appearance after the wrong call is not informative, because both the batter and pitcher are likely to
change their behavior between 2-1 and 1-2 counts. At 1-2, the batter may now strike out reaching for
the next pitch, which he may have comfortably let go if the count were correctly 2-1. Be they batter
or pitcher, no MLB player’s actions are independent of the count, and it is for this reason that any
attempts to reconstruct “what could/should have been” are futile.
This is why I have opted to use Markov chains to model the batter/pitcher interaction. For each
pitcher, we know how often he throws the ball in the zone, we know how likely batters are to swing at
his offerings, their chance of making contact or whiffing, etc. With Markov chains, we can use these to
estimate how many strikeouts, walks, and balls in play will result. Then we can attempt to estimate
how these numbers would change if the strike zone were automated. We can assume that any pitch
out of the zone that is incorrectly called a strike would now be a ball, and that any pitch taken in the
zone for a ball is now a strike. Despite the fact that players may sometimes chase pitches out of the
zone for fear of having them called borderline strikes, it is impossible to tell which swings fall in this
group and I believe most swings at balls occur because the batter is simply fooled.
Once we have figured pitcher’s actual expected rates of strikeouts, walks, and balls in play, and
their expected rates with the new strike zone automation, we can compare the two groups and attempt
to predict the change in MLB’s offensive environment. More strikeouts and fewer walks would almost
certainly mean a more pitcher-friendly environment, while more walks and fewer strikeouts would be
expected to help batters. If both walks and strikeouts move in the same direction, it will be more
difficult to assess any possible future changes in run scoring. Rates of balls in play do not need to be
examined, as they are simply the function of walk and strikeout rates (specifically, the rate of balls in
play is 1 minus the rate of (walks plus strikeouts)).
Baseball lends itself to Markov analysis much more so than the other major sports, and I am not
the first to recognize this fact [2]. Markov chains will be explained in detail in Methodologies.
1.3 PITCHf/x
If the strike zone were to be automated in the near future, the most likely technological candidate is
Sportvision’s PITCHf/x [3]. First used experimentally in the 2006 playoffs, PITCHf/x cameras are now
installed in every major league stadium and provide the data for MLB.com’s GameDay application,
which displays each pitch visually in real time. By capturing the game from the center field camera,
PITCHf/x can record the speed, break, and location of every pitch, accurate down to one mile an hour
and one inch.
There’s plenty of hard work behind the scenes to enable the technology to be so accurate in the first
place. Before even the groundskeepers get out there to do their job, a special crew sets up to ensure
that PITCHf/x works properly during the night’s game. Called the “registration” process, they place
colored or numbered markers on the first and third base lines, with another eight foot pole demarcating
home plate. This is captured by cameras high above home plate and first base, and one way out in
center field, in order to create the grid that allows PITCHf/x its tracking capabilities.
The center-field camera is also used for the extremely important job of “sizing” the batter. For the
software to accurately call the pitch, there needs to be a different strike zone for Jose Abreu than for
Jose Altuve, who is nearly a foot shorter than Abreu. While the players take batting practice before the
game, the PITCHf/x crew sizes each of them, marking where the top and bottom of the zone should
6
be for their natural batting stances. This particular zone is then remembered by PITCHf/x for each
subsequent plate appearance by that player.
According to Kurt Meyer [4], a broadcast engineer for SportVision, “a guy stands at home plate
with the eight-foot pole and marker, and then the software takes about 20 minutes to snap the grid
into place. That tells each of the computers where home plate is in relationship to the three cameras,
so they’re all on the same page. You’re telling the computer to look for a certain object between
parameters of speed ... a blob traveling between the mound and the plate.”
The pitch-tracking system sets those parameters of speed from 40 mph to 120 mph. That’s certainly
a wide enough range to capture every pitch, but it also prevents the system from picking up a trash
bag picked up by a gust of wind or a beach ball that’s gotten loose from the stands. Occasionally,
the system will accidentally pick up a third baseman charging towards the plate as the batter squares
to bunt. In this case, the crew must intervene to drag the grid on the software back to its intended
dimensions.
In addition, due to miscalibrations or just plain computer glitches, sometimes the system simply
misses a pitch. For this reason, it is likely that there will always remain an umpire behind home plate
as a technological failsafe of sorts.
1.4 Technology in other sports
When a free kick is awarded in soccer, the defending team is supposed to remain 10 yards from the
ball’s location until it is kicked, and the kicking team is not supposed to move the ball from the initial
location appointed by the ref. Scrounging for any miniscule advantage, it is common for defenders to
encroach closer than that, and for offensive players to try to nudge the ball toward the net. This is
simple human nature, analagous to children craning their necks to copy a test problem, knowing that
the teacher cannot keep her eye on all of them at once. In the same way, it is difficult for a referee to
control all of the players on the field and prevent them from, technically, cheating.
The similarity in baseball is the fuzziness at the edges of the strike zone. Pitchers and catchers
want to slowly expand the umpire’s strike zone by throwing a series of pitches successively further off
the plate. They must hit their spots precisely and frame the ball in such a way that it looks good to
the umpire to be successful, though. In addition, much as a referee cannot actually see the spot on the
ground where the ball should be or the imaginary line 10 yards away, an umpire cannot see the strike
zone, nor can he actually even see the ball the entire time. With these inherently human difficulties
come inevitable mistakes. These mistakes may be only tiny, but in a game of inches like soccer or
baseball, specifically given the fact that the strike zone is measured in inches to begin with, they can
make a tangible difference.
To solve this problem in soccer, vanishing spray [5] has now been introduced at the highest levels
of competitive play, making its first World Cup appearance in 2014. Vanishing spray, or foam, is
applied from an aerosol can to an athletic field to provide a visual marker. Invented in 2000 by Heine
Allemagne, it was first used in professional competition in the 2001 Brazilian Championship and soon
adopted in Brazilian play. With this invention, the referee can mark the ball’s location and then spray
a line 10 yards away that all the defenders must stay behind during the free kick. After about a minute,
the spray disappears, playing no part in the rest of the match until it may be needed again. It has
been considered a success so far, having no real drawbacks.
Baseball has given us another recent example of integrating technology into the sport with the use
of instant replay. Introduced for the 2014 season, the replay system allows managers to challenge a call
that they believe to be incorrect. To prevent abuse, a manager who loses a challenge (does not get the
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call overturned) may not challenge again in that game. Starting in the 7th inning however, managers
can request the umpires to review a close play regardless if they have already used a challenge. Instant
replay can be characterized as a success so far. Data is not yet readily available on the number of
calls upheld and overturned, but instant replay allowed some number of incorrect calls to be corrected
and did not intrude too much on the game. In this way, instant replay has been a successful model of
baseball adopting technology to improve the game.
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Chapter 2
The Data
2.1 Plate Discipline Data
To obtain the plate discipline data, I created a custom leaderboard at www.fangraphs.com [6] in
order to pick and choose which stats I wanted to examine. I selected the years 2007-2014, because those
are the years for which there exists complete plate discipline statistics. I chose Zone, O-swing, Z-swing,
O-contact, and Z-contact to display and clicked the “League Stats” option to view these percentages
for MLB as a whole for each of the last 8 seasons. Then I imported the data into Microsoft Excel, as
seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Plate Discipline statistics for 2007-2014
Over the last 8 seasons, Zone, O-swing, Z-swing, and Z-contact have remained essentially stable,
with only minor fluctuations. O-Contact is the only stat to display any trend and it has been trending
downward over the selected period.
2.2 Trends by Count
No MLB player’s actions are independent of the count. A pitcher is much more likely to throw a ball
when he is up in the count 0-2 than when he is behind 3-0. In the former case, he ideally wants to get
the batter out on a tough pitch and knows he can afford to throw a ball in the situation. In the latter
situation, throwing another ball means a baserunner, so the pitcher has more incentive to throw one
in the zone.
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Figure 2.2: Relative Zone, Z-swing, and O-swing percentages by count for 2014
Much like pitchers throwing in the zone, batters adjust their swing tendencies by count. A hitter
is much less likely to swing in a 3-0 count than one in which he has 2 strikes. At 3-0, he would like to
force the pitcher to prove that he can throw strikes, and knows he can afford to take a strike to make
the count 3-1. With 2 strikes, though, the batter must be wary of striking out and will swing more
often.
These basic trends are known to every serious baseball fan from simply watching the game, but
thanks to BaseballSavant [7], I was able to confirm these tendencies with data and quantify their affects.
Using the PITCHf/x search, I went through the year 2014 count by count and determined Zone, Z-
swing, and O-swing for each. I then divided these numbers by the overall Zone, Z-swing, and O-swing
data from FanGraphs and multiplied by 100 to get relative rates, Zone+, Z-swing+, and O-swing+, for
each count, such that 100 is average and 101 is 1% more than average (Figure 2.2). I did not repeat this
process for the other years because it was extremely time consuming and labor intensive, and 2014 is
the year I am most interested in anyway. That said, I used these same relative rates for the 2007-2013
seasons because it is certainly more accurate than making no adjustments for the count.
Looking at the first row, for example, we see 61 for Z-swing+, 52 for O-swing+, and 110 for Zone+.
This means that, in 0-0 counts, batters swung 39% less often at pitches in the zone than they did in
all counts. They swung 48% less frequently at pitches outside the zone than they did overall. And
pitchers were 10% more likely to throw the ball in the strike zone than they were when considering all
counts.
2.3 Umpire Accuracy
The last data set required is how often umpires screw up the call, according to PITCHf/x. Because
PITCHf/x is the system most likely to be used if umpires were replaced and because it is an objective,
unchanging strike zone, when I refer to umpires getting a call “wrong” or “right” it is in reference to
the PITCHf/x data. If the umpire’s call and PITCHf/x’s determination differ, the umpire is considered
to have made a mistake and missed the call.
Again, I wanted count by count data, so I returned to BaseballSavant’s [7] PITCHf/x search. For
each count for the year 2014, I recorded the number of called balls (by umpires) on pitches outside
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the strike zone (according to PITCHf/x), the number of called balls in the strike zone, the number of
called strikes outside the zone, and the number of called strikes in the zone. I then calculated the rate
of missed calls on pitches out of the zone and pitches in the zone for each count. Table 2.1 summarizes
my findings.
Table 2.1: Umpire accuracy by count
Count Pitches Zone Balls Rate incorrect Out of Zone Strikes Rate incorrect
0-0 183137 79507 3524 .075 102910 17345 .202
0-1 90814 31846 1304 .166 58968 3871 .097
0-2 45276 11182 333 .248 34094 844 .040
1-0 71976 31874 927 .075 39382 5946 .205
1-1 72042 28456 779 .135 43586 3348 .123
1-2 66190 19652 472 .230 46538 1351 .052
2-0 24461 11438 291 .065 12303 2153 .237
2-1 36363 16690 362 .122 19673 1775 .149
2-2 55425 20927 335 .186 34498 1299 .075
3-0 7950 3716 108 .033 3514 1033 .325
3-1 14900 7608 153 .085 7292 901 .188
3-2 32425 15711 148 .134 16714 691 .093
Once again, I did not repeat this process for the other seasons, as 2014 is the most important and
it is simply not worth the effort with my software capabilities. The two most important columns in
this table are the ones labeled “Rate incorrect”. The first, next to the “Balls” column, is the ratio of
called balls in the strike zone to called pitches in the strike zone. If an umpire were to call 1000 0-0
pitches that are inside the PITCHf/x strike zone, we would expect him to incorrectly call 75 of them
balls, for a success rate of 92.5%. Consequently, the other “Rate incorrect” column on the far right is
the chance of making a bad call on a pitch out of the zone. If an umpire were to call 1000 0-0 pitches
that are outside the PITCHf/x strike zone, we would expect 202 incorrect strike calls, a success rate
of less than 80%.
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Chapter 3
Methodologies
3.1 Markov Chains
A Markov chain [8] is a sequence of random variables with the Markov property, that is, given the
current state, the past and future states are independent. It is a random, memoryless mathematical
system that transitions from one state to another on some state space. Changes between the system’s
states are called transitions, and the probabilities associated with various state changes called transition
probabilities. A transition matrix containing all these probabilities becomes the state space. Since we
are using Markov chains to simulate plate appearances, our states are the states of the count in MLB.
The states that the count can be in at any time are 0-0, 0-1, 0-2, 1-0, 1-1, 1-2, 2-0, 2-1, 2-2, 3-0, 3-1,
and 3-2. For our purposes, we add the following states: strikeout, walk, and ball in play. In reality, all
these events signify the end of a plate appearance and the start of a new count, but we will treat them
as states of the count nonetheless to act as placeholders. This gives us a total of 15 different states
that the count can be in, and causes the transition matrix in Figure 3.1 to be 15x15 for each season.
With 225 total entries, the transition matrix for each season will be fairly large, but it is made
much more manageable by the natural laws of baseball. Since the state of the count is updated on
every single pitch, it is impossible to change the count by more than 1 strike or more than 1 ball at a
time. For example, an 0-1 count can only transition to 1-1 (after a ball is thrown), 0-2 (after a strike
is thrown), or a ball in play. In addition to this basic rule, 2-strike counts can transition to themselves
again if the pitch is fouled off, all 3-ball counts can lead to a walk, all 2-strike counts can transition to
strikeouts, and any count can become a ball in play. All told, the transition matrix for MLB only has
43 nonzero entries. For any given count, there are a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 4 states it can
transition to.
Once we have this transition matrix for each season, how do we use it to predict strikeout and
walk rates? Well, taking one iteration of the transition matrix simulates throwing one pitch. Taking
two iterations of the matrix simulates throwing two pitches. The vast majority of plate appearances
do not make it to 10 pitches, so taking 10 iterations would generally be enough to simulate a plate
appearance. To be extra safe, however, we can just take the limit of the matrix instead, since a plate
appearance is guaranteed to end by the time an infinite number of pitches have been thrown. The limit
of a transition matrix is the point at which the probable outcomes stabilize at a stationary distribution
[8]. In other words, the probabilities in the matrix will no longer change, no matter how many more
iterations are taken. To find the limit, we raise the transition matrix to successively higher powers
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that approach infinity. The limit of this matrix should look quite different from the transition matrix
itself. Its only nonzero values will be found in the K, BB, and BIP columns. This is because, after an
infinite number of pitches, it is impossible to arrive at a count like 0-1 or 3-2. The only possible states
are these “results” that never transition away from themselves.
After finding the limit of the transition matrix, we are only actually interested in the top row, the
intersection of a 0-0 count with K and BB. These represent the chances for a random plate appearance
starting at 0-0 to end in a strikeout or a walk. Since all plate appearances begin with a 0-0 count,
these are the chances that any given batter will strike out or walk.
3.2 Building the Transition Matrix
Figure 3.1: A generalized transition matrix
Each of the 43 nonzero transition probabilities is marked with either a 1 or a capital letter in Figure
3.1, meaning that it is possible to transition from the count indicated by the left column to the one
indicated by the top row. A 1 represents the intersection of either K, BB, or IP with itself. Since these
are not technically counts, once a plate appearances reaches one of these states it stays there, with
probability 1. Which letter appears at the intersection informs how to find the transition probability
for that particular state change.
A means to sum the chance of swinging strikes, called strikes, and fouls. For example, the probability
of transitioning from 0-0 to 0-1 is marked A, because in that situation a foul ball still nets the pitcher
a strike.
B means the chance of a ball being thrown. For example, the probability of transitioning from any
3 ball count to a walk is marked B, because a walk can only occur when a pitch is called a ball.
C means to sum the chance of swinging strikes and called strikes. For example, the intersection of
all 2 strike counts and the “strikeout” count are marked C, because a strikeout can be the result of
either a called or swinging strike.
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Figure 3.2: The calculated state space for 2014
D means the chance of a ball in play being hit. Every real baseball count (0-0 to 3-2) is marked D
where it intersects the ball in play (IP) column.
E means the chance of a foul ball being hit. For example, the 4 counts that can transition back to
themselves are all marked E, as the only way to not change the count is to hit a 2 strike foul.
Using the plate discipline data from FanGraphs [6] and the trends by count data from BaseballSavant
[7], I was able to calculate the entire state space for each season in Microsoft Excel. Transition
probabilities marked by the same letter are not equal (because they are more realistic) because of
the adjustments we have made by count, but they are usually in the same ballpark. The state space
for 2014 can be seen in Figure 3.2.
Here is how to find the probability of each possible result of a pitch, using Zone, O-swing, Z-swing,
O-contact, and Z-contact.
Swinging strikes: for a swinging strike to occur, the batter must swing and must not make contact.
(Zone) ∗
(
Zswing
)
∗ (1− Zcontact) + (OOZ) ∗
(
Oswing
)
∗ (1−Ocontact)
Called strikes: for a called strike to occur, the pitch must be in the zone and the batter must not
swing.
(Zone) ∗
(
1− Zswing
)
Balls: for a ball to occur, the pitch must be outside the zone and the batter must not swing.
(OOZ) ∗
(
1−Oswing
)
Fouls/Balls in play: for a foul ball or a ball in play to occur, the batter must swing and make
contact. It is possible to find the chance of a ball in play in a season, and thus the chance of a foul
ball, by taking the total number of batters faced in a season and subtracting out the strikeouts, walks,
and hit batsmen and dividing by total batter faced.
Balls in play:
BIP =
(TBF )− (K)− (BB)− (HBP )
TBF
So to find the chance of a foul ball we can calculate the chance of a contacted ball and subtract out
the chance it is in play.
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Figure 3.3: The state space for a hypothetical 2014 with an automated zone
Fouls = (Zone) ∗
(
Zswing
)
∗ (Zcontact) + (OOZ) ∗
(
Oswing
)
∗ (Ocontact)−BIP
3.3 Simulating a Hypothetical 2014
So what would the 2014 transition matrix look like if the strike zone were automated? Let’s create a
new one for a hypothetical season in some alternate universe where PITCHf/x was used to automate
the strike zone before the 2014 season. We can assume that any result which includes a swing will be
unchanged. Hitters may sometimes knowingly chase pitches out of the zone because they are unsure if
the umpire will make the correct call, but I think this is a negligible amount and that they are usually
just fooled. This leaves balls (all balls are called by the umpire) and called strikes as the only possible
areas of change. Since there are only two, our job is even easier because calculating the change in one
will also necessarily be the change in the other.
Using the BaseballSavant data [7] on umpire accuracy and the 2014 transition matrix, we can
recalculate the expected chances of a called strike or called ball for each count if every call were
according to PITCHf/x. To find the new chance of a called strike, just take the actual chance of a
called strike, add the chance of an incorrectly called ball (because PITCHf/x would call it a strike), and
subtract the chance of an incorrectly called strike (because PITCHf/x would not make that mistake).
Since we are not changing the total number of called pitches, called balls will increase by the exact
amount that called strikes decrease in every count. This means that only the transition probabilities
marked by D or E are the unchanged from the actual 2014 transition matrix, as those marked A, B,
or C all are affected by either called balls or called strikes. This new matrix can be seen in Figure 3.3.
I also created a hypothetical matrix like this for every season 2007-2013, using the 2014 data, but
because of that extrapolation only the 2014 results will be focused on. With all 16 transition matrices
created (one real and one hypothetical for each of the 8 seasons), I turned to MATLAB to find the
limits of these gigantic matrices for me. The code I used can be found in section 7.1.
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Chapter 4
Results
As stated, I used MATLAB to find the limits of these matrices and extract the values we are interested
in, as detailed in the section about Markov chains.
Ideally, in the limit of the real matrix these values would be the actual strikeout and walk rates
in MLB for each year. For the limit of the hypothetical matrix, these values would, in theory, be the
strikeout and walk rates MLB could have expected had it implemented a fully-automated strike zone
in that year.
In Figure 4.1, the columns labeled “K” and “BB” contain these values from the limit of the first
matrix each year, the one using actual data. The columns labeled “K(pfx)” and “BB(pfx)” contain
the values from the limit of the second matrix each year, the one that attempts to account for umpires
making incorrect calls. (pfx) stands for PITCHf/x, as these strikeout and walk rates are the ones we
would expect if PITCHf/x replaced umpires for calling balls and strikes.
For reasons previously mentioned, I will only be looking at 2014 for analysis. The first thing to
notice is how close the Markov-predicted rates (20.9 K% and 7.6 BB%) are to the rates actually seen in
MLB (20.4 K% and 7.0 BB%). This is a good sign. The model predicts a 4 percentage point decrease
in strikeouts (to 16.9%) and a corresponding 4 percentage point increase in walks (to 11.0%) if the
strike zone had been automated in 2014.
To a baseball fan, these seem like pretty drastic changes; what kind of effect would they have on
run-scoring? Luckily, we have a handy statistic to estimate this: Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP).
FIP is an ERA estimator based on only 4 inputs: home runs, strikeouts, walks, and innings pitched.
In this hypothetical 2014 with an automated strike zone, there is no reason to think that home runs
or innings would be changed significantly. So we can simply take the 2014 hypothetical strikeout and
Figure 4.1: Markov-predicted strikeout and walk rates
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walk rates, multiply them by batters faced to get strikeout and walk totals, and then recalculate FIP
with these new inputs. 2014’s FIP would be expected to increase from 3.80 to 4.72, or nearly a full
run per game! So for anyone who has been missing the high scoring games of the late 1990s and early
2000s, automating the strike zone could be a welcome breath of fresh, run-producing air.
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Chapter 5
Survey
The Survey
1. During the MLB season, about how many hours a week do you spending watching or listening to
baseball?
2. How many major league baseball games do you typically attend during the season?
3. An average MLB game features about 300 pitches, approximately half of which are called by the
umpire. How many of these 150 calls do you think umpires get wrong, on average?
4. Regardless of your answer to #2, what do you think is the highest acceptable number of these
missed calls?
5. Are you in favor of a fully automated strike zone? Y/N
6. Are you in favor of a semi-automated strike zone, in which the umpire is informed by the system,
but can still make his own calls? Y/N
7. Do you think switching to an automated strike zone would be more beneficial to hitters, pitchers,
or neither?
8. If an automated strike zone were guaranteed to increase offense, would you support the change?
9. MLB has just concluded its first season using instant replay. Has the introduction of replay
affected your interest in watching baseball?
Using SurveyMonkey [9], I surveyed 100 people in order to glean some insight into others’ perception
of the game. How good a job do they think umpires do? Do they think there is room for improvement?
Should that improvement come through technology or just better training for umpires? I emailed the
survey to WPI students, and to ensure that people would respond, I did some research on how to
conduct a survey [10]. I found that online surveys should be no more than 5 pages, especially not
without some sort of progress bar. The respondent should not have to scroll very much on each page
and a little color to look at while they answer never hurts. I also learned that possible responses to
survey questions should be kept simple and, if at all possible, should be choices to click rather than
open ended responses, as these can allow user error to weaken your results.
18
Figure 5.1: Those who indicated watching some amount of baseball opposed a fully automated zone
Due to incomplete responses, I threw out 4 of the surveys and was left with 96 complete responses
to analyze. To provide a different and perhaps more informed viewpoint, I also conducted an inter-
view with Mike Callahan, WPI’s head baseball coach and former minor league umpire, who could be
considered a baseball insider (transcribed in full in section 7.2).
One aspect of the survey that was particularly interesting to me was examining the opinions of
those who would likely proclaim themselves “baseball fans.” One of the possible responses to question
9 is “I don’t watch baseball.” Using this as a proxy for possibly uninformed opinions, we can filter the
data and see only the views of those who care at least somewhat about the game. When this is done,
we are left with 83 respondents. These respondents were against a fully automated strike zone by a 2:1
margin (Figure 5.1), but in favor of a semi-automated zone by the same margin (Figure 5.2). These
are about the same ratios seen in the entire survey, not just the baseball fans.
The questions I most looked forward to seeing the results for were #3 and #4, regarding perceptions
of how umpires currently perform and how they (or some new technology) SHOULD perform. Over-
whelmingly, respondents felt that there are too many bad calls in today’s game. 28% of respondents
believe that umpires miss more than 15 calls per game right now, but only 7% agree that that is an
acceptable number. Only 39% of people think umps are making 10 or fewer mistakes per game, but a
whopping 79% believe that is how good they should be.
Let’s attempt to quantify this disparity. The possible answers to these questions are all ranges of
numbers, like 1-5 or 6-10. But working with ranges of numbers can be confusing and is not necessary.
Instead, consider every response to be numerically equal to the lowest number in the selected range
(so a person who answered 11-15 is recorded as simply 11). It could also be recorded as the highest
number in the range, or the middle one, but the specifics do not matter and this is an inexact process
anyway. This gives an average of around 10 missed calls for question #3 (Figure 5.3)and around 5 for
question #4 (Figure 5.4). So the average survey respondent believes there are up to twice as many
missed calls today compared to what they find acceptable. These figures run contrary to the opinion of
Coach Callahan. While he did not put a number on it, he expressed the sentiment that MLB umpires
are currently doing an excellent job calling balls and strikes accurately. In addition, he noted that
consistency is an important factor as well. If an umpire makes 10 incorrect calls per game, a batter
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Figure 5.2: Just as strongly, however, they supported a semi-automated zone
would certainly rather they be on similar pitches than randomly distributed (i.e. the umpire tends to
call strikes on pitches that are too low, but not those that are too high).
Not surprisingly, this led to much support for some form of technology in calling balls and strikes.
Of the 96 respondents, 28% were in favor of either a fully or a semi-automated zone, 8% were only
in favor of a fully automated zone, 39% were only in favor of a semi-automated zone, and 25% were
against a fully or semi-automated strike zone. Despite effectively being a sample size of one, Coach
Callahan’s responses were consistent with these findings. Those surveyed were generally in favor of
some sort of technology to assist umpires, but they were not willing to abandon the current system to
let PITCHf/x make the calls. Coach Callahan seemed open to the idea of using technology to improve
umpire accuracy, but admitted he was not sure how he would feel about making big changes to the
foundation of the game, citing the “human element” in particular.
It seems there are a few folks who just can’t be pleased, though. Of the 25% who were against any
type of automated strike zone, more than a quarter of them think that any number of bad calls that
can’t be counted on one hand is unacceptable. It is foolish to think that umpires today represent the
pinnacle of human strike-calling ability, but they are likely very close. Umpires have been around for
over 100 years and have only had to undergo more rigorous training and scrutiny as time passes. It
seems extremely unlikely that they will ever overcome the physical limitations that involve tracking
100 MPH pitches, so expecting their error rate to drop to the 3% these respondents require is just not
very feasible.
Breaking the survey respondents into two groups based on how many missed calls they find ac-
ceptable provides some fascinating results. One group is those who think more than 5 missed calls
is unacceptable, and the other group is everyone else. There were 43 people in the first group, and
they exhibit some distinct response patterns that go against the results of the survey as a whole. They
actually supported a fully automated zone, 23 to 20 (Figure 5.5), and even more so if it were guaranteed
to bring more offense, 29 to 14 (Figure 5.6). These patterns make sense, but are strikingly different
from those more lenient about missed calls. They were against an automated zone, 44 to 13 (Figure
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Figure 5.3: Survey respondents think umpires today average 10-15 missed calls per game
Figure 5.4: Generally, though, they believe that 5-10 missed calls is an acceptable number
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Figure 5.5: Those who demanded very few missed calls were the only group to support automating the
strike zone
5.7), and did not change their tune much if it would bring more offense, being against that 38 to 19
(Figure 5.8).
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Figure 5.6: They were also the only group to support the change if it meant more offense
Figure 5.7: Those who are willing to accept more bad calls were strongly opposed to a fully automated
zone
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Figure 5.8: In general, their responses were more in line with the general survey results
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Chapter 6
Discussion
Are these figures what we should actually expect to see, though? The league strikeout rate has not
been that low in 15 years, and the league walk rate has never reached 11%, topping out at 10.5% in
1949. I strongly suspect that pitchers would begin to adapt almost immediately to counteract the huge
increase in walks. In doing so, they would also probably lose a few more percentage points from their
strikeout rates, since the path to allowing fewer walks is through throwing more hittable pitches. So
the increase in walks may not be quite as large as predicted by the Markov model, but the decrease in
strikeouts may very well be even larger.
In addition to the fact that players will adjust their tendencies with an automated strike zone, there
are a few other caveats to consider about this project. While the adjustments made for zone and swing
rates are important and have a significant effect, there are still more possible factors to be accounted
for, most importantly the handedness of the batter and pitcher. The preceding pitch is also likely
to have some influence, as pitchers are generally less willing to throw the same pitch twice in a row
than random chance would suggest. If the prior pitch was the pitcher’s weakest pitch type, we may
expect a higher chance of a strike than usual in a certain count. However, this would make the process
technically not a Markov chain, as its transition probabilities would not be independent of past states.
It would also be incredibly difficult to implement for what seems like a marginal improvement.
The future implications of this study are nearly endless, though. With the ability to predict strikeout
and walk rates from more granular data that stabilizes more quickly, a Markov analysis like this could
be used to determine if an overperforming pitcher could keep up his performance or if an aging vet
is actually done for or could make a comeback. Markov chains could also be applied at the plate
appearance level and use base-out states rather than states of the count to better estimate a pitcher’s
“deserved” ERA.
Unfortunately, however, it seems that we may have to wait some time before the baseball world at
large is ready for automated strike zones. The responses from my survey indicated that baseball fans
are not yet ready to take pitch calling out of the hands of umpires. And perhaps this is for the better,
as the expected strikeout and walk rates I found are dramatically different from the rates we see today.
Such a large and sudden change could produce unintended effects, and it is difficult to blame those
fans for being wary of a major change.
They are willing, though, to give the umpire some help in the form of a semi-automated strike zone.
This could be achieved by simply having someone relay the PITCHf/x call to the home plate umpire
via headset. This would eliminate the most egregious calls and still allow some of the “human element”
that has always been such a big part of the game. As the umpires grow more comfortable with this
system, they may begin to defer to the headset call more and more often, effectively introducing a fully
automated strike zone over a longer period of time.
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As noted in chapter 5, I also interviewed Mike Callahan, WPI’s head baseball coach and former
minor league umpire (transcribed in full in section 7.2). I did not ask the same questions used in the
survey, but our conversation revealed that he was against a fully automated strike zone, while being
open to something perhaps less extreme that umpires could use for confirmation. This is consistent
with the views expressed by the survey respondents, and perhaps lends further weight to the opinions
of those who may not be as knowledgeable about baseball as he is.
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Chapter 7
Appendix
7.1 MATLAB code
fileroot = ’IQP’;
xlRange = ’A1:Q12’;
MATLABquirk=’.xlsx’;
C=cell(9,5);
C(1,1)=cellstr(’Year’);
C(1,2)=cellstr(’K’);
C(1,3)=cellstr(’BB’);
C(1,4)=cellstr(’K(pfx)’);
C(1,5)=cellstr(’BB(pfx)’);
for k=7:14
nst=int2str(200+k);
st=(200+k);
filename=[fileroot nst MATLABquirk];
M = xlsread(filename, xlRange);
[ndata, text, alldata] = xlsread(filename);
Z=zeros(15);
for i=1:11
Z(i,i+1)=M(i,1);
end
Z(3,4)=0;
Z(6,7)=0;
Z(9,10)=0;
for i=1:9
Z(i,i+3)=M(i,2);
end
for i=10:12
Z(i,14)=M(i,2);
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end
for i=1:4
Z(3*i,13)=M(3*i,3);
Z(3*i,3*i)=M(3*i,4);
end
for i=1:12
Z(i,15)=M(i,5);
end
for i=13:15
Z(i,i)=1;
end
A=Z^15;
C(k-5,2)=num2cell(A(1,13));
C(k-5,3)=num2cell(A(1,14));
C(k-5,1)=num2cell(2000+k);
for i=1:11
Z(i,i+1)=M(i,13);
end
Z(3,4)=0;
Z(6,7)=0;
Z(9,10)=0;
for i=1:9
Z(i,i+3)=M(i,14);
end
for i=10:12
Z(i,14)=M(i,14);
end
for i=1:4
Z(3*i,13)=M(3*i,15);
Z(3*i,3*i)=M(3*i,16);
end
for i=1:12
Z(i,15)=M(i,17);
end
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for i=13:15
Z(i,i)=1;
end
B=Z^15;
C(k-5,4)=num2cell(B(1,13));
C(k-5,5)=num2cell(B(1,14));
end
C
7.2 Interview transcript
I managed to get WPI head coach and former college umpire Mike Callahan to sit down for a chat
about the possibility of automating MLB’s strike zone. Here is our conversation.
Joe: So, are you for automating the strike zone?
Coach Callahan: No, I don’t think I would be. I think human error is kind of part of baseball and
automating the strike zone - the game might just become too robotic I guess is the way I would put it.
J: I’m looking into full automation, where a system would make the call no matter what, or perhaps
one where the umpire still makes the initial call, but then has a system-generated call relayed to him
for confirmation.
C: I guess that’s a little bit like the replay that they have now, but I wouldn’t want to see the entire
game fully automated. Like I said, the game has always been partly human error, but I don’t know
if it wouldn’t take away from it a little. It would make the game 100 percent correct I guess, but it
might make it a little boring. I don’t really know how I would feel about doing the whole thing.
J: So, in regards to the human error that comes from umpires making the calls, how good of a job
do you think they’re doing now? Are they getting almost every call correct?
C: I mean, if you watch when they show the replays I bet you there were more calls that were
upheld than were overturned when they went to review it, so I think they do a pretty good job. It is
a pretty slow game.
J: What about the calls umpires make purely on balls and strikes, rather than plays in the field?
C: I think they get more right than they miss for sure, but there are some guys that have a bigger
zone than others, so I think part of it is knowing what umpire you have and knowing if he’s got a big
strike zone, or he’s got a small strike zone, or he’s going to call the ball high vs. call the ball low.
J: So you’re more concerned with consistency.
C: Yeah. And like I said, I’m for the replays on home runs and balls and strikes and diving catches.
I’m okay with it all.
J: So you’re for replay if it determines the finality of the play?
C: Yeah, pretty much, but even still if the umpire at first base calls him out, he’s out. But if it’s
a diving play and it’s not clear if he traps the ball or catches it, I’m fine with reviewing that, because
it could be one of the best catches you’ve ever seen. But then you can go back to the play at first
base that happened two years ago where he almost threw the perfect game, and that could be a good
reason why you can argue both sides. Being a coach and playing my whole life though, I’m just not
100 percent for it or against it. I’m kind of somewhere in between.
J: In your experience, is integrating technology into sports generally good for the sport?
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C: Like I said, I don’t know if I’m for it or against it, but I guess any time you can make sure
things are called correctly more often it’s a pretty good argument for why you should have it. We
don’t have that kind of technology at the college level so everything is based on human error. I would
be more apt to use technology at our level than I would be at a professional level because our umps
aren’t professional. MLB umpires are better than ours so it would probably benefit us more to make
calls correct. We also only have two umpires in college vs. four or six for MLB so there are already a
lot more eyes out there for them.
J: And if you don’t have an automated strike zone at any of the lower levels, it’s possible that
players would have a big adjustment to make when they reach the major leagues and the strike zone
is automated.
C: Exactly. I don’t know to what degree I would want it; the entire game is pretty big on tradition.
J: It does have that charm. I’m a huge baseball fan, too, and I generally don’t like change. There
are a lot of articles being written now that go into detail about the criticisms of the umps, but for the
most part, I think umpires do a great job.
C: Yeah, especially at a professional level. Like I said, if you come and watch some college games
you’d shake your head and wonder how you can get paid and miss so many calls. That’s why I think it
would probably benefit us more because I bet 75-80 percent were probably the right call in the majors.
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